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Introduction 
 
 
This paper focuses on the importance of asset development and preservation.  Assets, such as 
savings, investments or home ownership, are an integral means to family financial stability and 
growth.  However, the increase in high cost consumer and home mortgage debt are a dangerous 
threat to asset preservation.  This paper explores the nature and growing prevalence of these 
threats as well as a model program to safeguard the assets of lower-income consumers.  The 
Consumer Rescue Fund is a innovative program administered by the National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) that employs several strategies that enable consumers to 
preserve home ownership in the face of foreclosure by high cost lenders.   
 
This paper has four sections.  It begins with a description of the important role that ownership of 
assets plays for families and consumers.  This section also addresses the challenges that lower-
income and minority consumers face in building assets, such as limited or stagnating incomes, 
adverse public policies that hinder asset development, inadequate savings and investment 
products, poor access to affordable financial services, prevalence of high cost financial services, 
and a significant consumer financial management skills gap.   
 
A description of the explosion of consumer and home mortgage products comprises the second 
section of this report. It includes a depiction of wealth depleting predatory consumer loan and 
home mortgage and market trends, key features of high cost loans and an analysis of consumers 
targeted by these products. This section of the paper describes how wealth stripping products not 
only threaten the assets of individuals and families, but also have profound community impacts.  
A brief review of the literature as well as summaries of research conducted by NCRC, the 
Woodstock Institute and other researchers is included. 
 
The third section of the paper describes an innovative wealth preserving program established by 
the NCRC. Launched in 2001, the Consumer Rescue Fund (CRF) features wealth preserving 
strategies to assist homeowners with predatory mortgages retain their homes. In partnership with 
local community-based and counseling organizations, CRF helps consumers in 17 states 
negotiate loan forbearance and/or modifications.  When necessary to avoid bankruptcy and/or 
foreclosure, CRF staff work with financial institutions to provide refinance loans at or below 
market interest rates to save families’ homes and provide them with affordable loans. CRF, 
which has helped more than 1,000 consumers, has established a model of industry-community 
group collaboration and best practices, which has the potential to reach thousands of additional 
families as it and similar programs attain scale.  As a founding partner with NCRC, HSBC North 
America provides refinance loans for consumers in the CRF program and supports CRF 
counseling as well as mediation efforts. 
 
The final section of this paper explores legislative and regulatory recommendations for 
policymakers. In addition, recommendations are offered to consumers, practitioners, and 
foundations for establishing wealth preserving products and services.  
 
This paper supplements the fair lending research on high cost lending by providing quantitative 
data on the income, racial and gender composition of CRF loan recipients.  It also provides case 
studies and data on the asset-stripping features of predatory loans in the CRF database.   
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Benefits of Asset Development 
 
Ownership of assets can enable lower-income families to significantly improve their financial 
status. Asset accumulation is a measure of an individual's or family’s accumulated resources. An 
asset is anything of economic value, such as homes, or savings, that can be bought, sold, 
invested, or set-aside for future financial returns.  
 
Assets have vital long-term financial and social benefits.  Assets are a source of future income, 
and can leverage the accumulation of additional assets. For instance, savings can be used as a 
downpayment on a home or home equity can be used to obtain loans to start a small business or 
to finance a child’s college tuition.  Further, the development of assets has benefits for families 
and communities, such as increasing civic participation and improving household or marital 
stability. 
 
Asset development is vital to countering two widespread and related trends: the alarming 
increase in consumer debt and falling savings rates.  On one hand, consumer debt is exploding— 
totaling more than $2.1 trillion at the end of 2005.  In fact, consumer debt for each American age 
18 and over is almost $10,000. A growing proportion of consumers will be unable to pay off 
these debts, resulting in increased consumer bankruptcies and higher losses for lenders. More 
than 1.6 million Americans filed for bankruptcy in the 12 months ending June 30, 2005, roughly 
double the number of filings a decade earlier.  On the other hand, the savings rate has decreased 
from over 9 percent of disposal income to a negative savings rate in 2004.1  Some researchers 
attribute increased consumer debt to depleted savings—consumers are relying more on credit 
cards and other forms of consumer debt and home refinance loans to pay consumer expenses.2   
 
Asset development also impacts an individual’s ability to obtain and sustain employment.  A 
poor credit rating can inhibit a consumer’s ability to purchase a car, which may be integral to 
transportation to work in many regions.   Further, credit ratings serve as empirical datum by 
many potential employers that use them to assess an applicant reliability, stability, and other 
factors. About 35 percent of the companies surveyed by the Society for Human Resource 
Management pulled the credit reports of current or potential employees in 2005, up from 19 
percent in 1996.3  Firms also subject employees to credit screening as a criteria for job 
promotions. In addition, financial security can also impact a person’s ability to maintain 
employment.  Employees with serious credit or money problems often have higher rates of 
absenteeism, tardiness, wage garnishments, pay advances, 401(k) loans, lost productivity, and 
theft.4   
 
Asset development is also integral to retirement planning and meeting increasing medical 
expenses.  More than 50 million Americans have no retirement savings beyond Social Security, 
and only half of American workers currently participate in any employer-provided pension plan.  
Social Security, which most lower-income people rely to fund their retirements, is woefully 
inadequate at meeting the rising consumer and medical costs that seniors face.  As health costs 
increase, employer medical plans mandate that consumers pay a portion of medical bills and 
services.  In addition, co-payments or deductibles are also increasing.  As a result, the proportion 
                                                 
1 Kish, 2006 
2 McConnell, Peach & Al-Haschimi, 2003 
3 Weston, 2005 
4 Williams, Haldeman & Cramer, 1996 
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of low-income, privately insured, working-age Americans with chronic conditions, such as 
diabetes, asthma or depression, spending more than 5 percent of their incomes on out-of-pocket 
medical costs jumped from 28 percent to 42 percent between 2001 and 2003.5   Many of them 
wind up in debt and in consequence, resort to bankruptcy for relief.  This problem is even more 
dire for those who are uninsured.  Assets, including savings, can allow lower-income people pay 
high deductibles and other expenses that are not reimbursed. 
 
 
Disparities in Asset Development 
 
 
The accumulation of assets by lower-income consumers is particularly important.  Efforts to 
alleviate poverty have traditionally concentrated on strategies to increase the income of lower-
income households through employment and training, tax policy, and income redistribution. 
Recently, policymakers, academics, and practitioners have recognized the importance of 
empowering poor families to build assets so that they can reach self-sufficiency and as a 
financial cushion during financial hard times.  For lower-income families who often live from 
paycheck to paycheck, assets can enable them to significantly improve their financial stability. 
Savings can be used to pay emergency costs, negating the need for high priced consumer loans.  
Home ownership can facilitate building equity that can be used to finance a child’s college 
education.   
 
It is widely known that the distribution of income is uneven. However, asset distribution is even 
more disproportionate. In 2001, the top five percent of households owned 59.2 percent of assets 
in the U.S. This disparity is clearly related to income and race. The average wealth of the poorest 
40 percent of the population was $2,900 in 2001, a 44 percent decrease from 1983.  For every 
dollar of wealth owned by white families, African-American families owned only 19 cents.6   
African Americans have far less money saved in retirement accounts than whites. Their median 
amount saved is $59,000 compared to $93,000 for whites. African-Americans also contribute 
less to their retirement accounts monthly.7 
 
In times of economic hardship, lower wage workers suffer more significant asset depletion than 
their more affluent counterparts.  In the years prior to the 2001 recession, white, Hispanic, and 
African-American families were generating wealth through savings, investment, and 
homeownership.  However, during the recession and jobless recovery, Hispanic and African-
American families lost over one-quarter of their wealth while the wealth of white families grew 
slowly at 2 percent.8 
 
The wealth accumulated from past generations often provides a substantial head start in life and 
enables current generations to further increase their wealth.  These opportunities to build wealth 
and assets through the generations are often available for whites but not minorities. According to 
Thomas Shapiro, young, white middle class-families typically purchase their first homes and 
begin building significant equity with substantial financial assistance from their family.  No such 
assistance is available for many lower-income and minority first time home buyers. 
                                                 
5 Cassil, 2004 
6 Wolff, May 2004 
7 Singletary, 2006 
8 Shapiro, 2004 
 7
 
Women also face challenges to developing assets.  Pensions are a case in point.  Half of all 
women have relatively low paid jobs without pensions. Further, those women who do have 
pensions receive only half the average pension benefits that men receive.9  Women also often 
experience difficulties financing and purchasing homes and small businesses. 
 
Asset development programs that focus on lower-income consumers and families are therefore 
vital.  Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and home 
purchase counseling and purchase programs, provide lower-income people with the support they 
need to build savings, purchase a home, start a business, pay college tuition, and build other 
assets. 
 
Why do these disparities in asset development occur? Obstacles to asset development are a 
complex combination of income disparities, adverse public policies, inadequate savings and 
investment products. Lower-income consumers also experience poor access to the financial 
mainstream and an increased prevalence on high cost financial services in their communities. 
Further, we are witnessing a growing financial skills gap of consumers due to an explosion of 
complex loan and investment products.  In addition, the explosion of asset stripping high cost 
loans to lower-income and minority consumers is having a significant impact of the asset 
development of these consumers. 
 
Income Disparities   
Despite the strong economic growth and tight labor markets of recent years, income disparities 
were significantly greater in the late 1990s than they were during the 1980s.  A study of family 
income trends in the US by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and the Economic Policy 
Institute found that in two-thirds of the states, the gap in incomes between the top 20 percent of 
families and the bottom 20 percent of families grew between the late 1980s and the late 1990s.  
The authors of the report attribute income disparities primarily to wage stagnation.  The incomes 
of lower-wage workers stagnated or grew slowing in the 1980s and 1990s.  In contrast, the wages 
of higher-income workers grew significantly.10  
 
Income disparities not only impact lower-income families—they also have community impacts.  
Areas of concentrated poverty grew from 1970 to 1990 in terms of geographical size, the number 
of census tracts, total population, as a percentage of overall population, and in terms of the 
percentage of poor persons living within them.11 The share of all poor people in tracts with 
poverty rates between 20-30 percent increased from 18 to 21 percent, resulting in increased rates 
of poverty in inner cities as well as suburban communities.12  Rural communities are also not 
immune to high levels of poverty.  Almost 20 percent of rural counties had poverty rates of 20% 
or higher in every decennial census between 1970 and 2000 compared to 4% of urban counties.13 
 
Adverse Public Policies   
Middle and higher income people get tax breaks for many financial transactions from owning 
homes to putting money in retirement plans, college funds and health savings accounts.  These 
                                                 
9 Women’s Institute for a Secure Retirement, N.D. 
10 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and the Economic Policy Institute, 2002 
11 Dreier, Mollenkopf & Swanstrom, 2005 
12 Pettit & Kingsley, 2003 
13 Rural Policy Research Institute, 2006 
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traditional tax incentives for assets are often not sufficiently strong for people in lower tax 
brackets, as they lack the income and financial resources to take advantage of them.  
 
Inadequate Savings and Investment Products   
There is also a scarcity of good savings products.  Savers forego huge sums annually when they 
keep substantial deposits in low yield savings.  According to the Consumer Federation of 
America, US consumers have over $1 trillion  in low-rate passbook saving, statement saving, and 
money market deposit accounts earning interest of about 2 percent.   
 
Mutual funds and retirement plans are often not an option for lower-income consumers.  Many 
mutual funds have prohibitively high minimum opening deposits of $250 or more.14  Employer 
pension plans are not made use of by lower-wage workers for several reasons.  They are difficult 
to understand, may only allow employees to enroll after an extended period of employment 
therefore lessening their chance of taking advantage of this savings opportunity and are often not 
transferable to a new employer.15  Further, employers often make optioning out of the pension 
plan as the default position.  In addition, many low wage employers do not offer their employees 
a savings plan—as a result, two-thirds of tax benefits for pensions go to top 20 percent of the 
income ladder.16   
 
Poor Access to the Financial Mainstream    
Consumers need affordable means to cash checks, pay bills and save.  However, many lower-
income and minority consumers have no or a limited relationship to mainstream financial 
services.  One-fifth of lower-income consumers do not have a relationship with a bank or credit 
union.17  The rates of the unbanked are even higher for minority consumers.  A 2004 survey by 
the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University found that 52.4 percent of 
respondents termed “unbanked” were black and 35.3 percent were Hispanic.18 
 
Consumers cite a number of reasons for being unbanked or underbanked, including high 
minimum balances or initial deposits, fair to poor credit ratings, ChexSystems19 problems, high 
fees, distrust of financial institutions, lack marketing or inadequate financial literacy. In addition, 
mainstream financial institutions are hard to find in lower-income and minority communities.  A 
Woodstock Institute study of the Chicago region examined the locations of full service bank 
branches from 2000-2004.  The researchers found that although the number of branches 
increased significantly, that many communities are underserved: 
 
• Low-income zip codes had less than one office per 10,000 people in 2004; moderate-
income zip codes had 1.4 offices per 10,000 people during that period; upper-income zip codes 
had over four offices per 10,000 people in 2004.   
                                                 
14 Barr, 2005 
15 American Benefits Council, July 12, 2005 
16 Orszag & Greenstein, 2000 
17 Hilgert, Hogarth & Beverly, 2003 
18 Berry, February 2004 
19 ChexSystems is a network of banks and credit unions that regularly contribute negative consumer information on 
checking and savings accounts. Negative information usually consists of nonsufficient funds (NSF), bounced 
checks, and unpaid overdraft fees. This information is shared among member institutions to help them assess the risk 
of opening new accounts. Approximately 90 percent of U.S. banks use ChexSystems, therefore a listing greatly 
reduces a consumer’s chances of obtaining a checking account. 
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• Both low- and moderate- income zip codes have $111 million aggregate income per full 
service office compared to less than $80 million for middle-income zip codes and about $91 
million for upper-income zip codes.   
• Predominately minority zip code areas had an aggregate household income of over $124 
million per bank office compared to under $87 million in predominately white zip codes.20   
 
Similar results were found by a National Community Reinvestment (NCRC) study of the 
Cincinnati area. Despite the fact that 51 percent of the City of Cincinnati’s residents live in low- 
and moderate-income census tracts, only 28 percent of bank branches were located there. 
Further, 34 percent of the City of Cincinnati’s population resided in predominantly minority 
census tracts, but only 14 percent of branches were located in these communities.21 
 
Prevalence of High Cost Financial Services   
Access to affordable services is but one challenge for lower-income communities that have no or 
little relationships with mainstream financial institutions.  These communities are also targeted 
by check cashers, high cost fringe financial companies that charge up to three times as much for 
basic financial services.  Check cashers are disproportionately located in minority communities.  
In Chicago, of the approximately 400 check cashers, nearly 100 are located in just 12 
communities—all with predominantly lower-income minority residents.  Moreover, the ratio of 
check cashers to banks in these areas is as high as 12:1.22    
 
Significant Financial Management Skills Gap   
An equitable and fair marketplace is predicated on knowledgeable consumers that have the 
ability to make informed choices.  In addition, in order to be more responsible for their own 
financial well-being, it is important for consumers to understand the basics of the financial 
landscape as well as more complex concepts so that they can avoid scams, stay out of debt, and 
build assets. Asset development requires significant person-to-person training and education on 
budgeting, financial planning, ability to assess the cost of credit, and acquiring fairly priced loans 
free of abuses.  The growing complexity of financial services necessitates that consumers 
understand the workings of a multitude of savings options (pension plans, mutual funds, money 
market accounts, certificates of deposits, health and education savings plans, etc).  Credit options 
are also complex, including legal and regulatory concepts such as  annual percentage rates 
(APR), mandatory arbitration, private rights to action, use of universal default by credit card 
banks, and a multitude of other specifications. 
 
In addition to these issues, the wealth of modest income consumers is being depleted by high 
cost loans. Lower-income, minority and women homeowners are targeted by predatory lenders 
for abusive consumer loans and home ownership and refinance loans, which can lead to financial 
distress, bankruptcy, default and foreclosure.  
 
 
                                                 
20 Smith, 2005 
21 National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2006 
22 Mullen, Bush & Weinstein, March, 1997 
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Introduction to Asset Stripping Products 
 
During the last 10 years, several consumer and home mortgage products have developed that 
strip the hard won assets of vulnerable consumers.  Consumer products have evolved that 
leverage a consumer’s paycheck, automobile or income tax refund for high cost, short term 
loans. In addition, checking account overdraft protection programs and credit cards also harm 
consumers due to high fees and interest rates. All of these fringe and bank products drain billions 
of dollars from minority and lower income families and communities.  There has also been an 
explosion of predatory home mortgages that disproportionately impact lower-income and 
minority consumers. 
 
Predatory Consumer Loans 
 
Payday Loans Payday lenders leverage a consumer’s paycheck to make high cost payday 
and installment loans.  Despite this lure of quick cash, the costs of payday lending are 
significant. In Illinois, where no usury laws exist, a one year payday installment loan of $2,000 
costs a borrower over $4,000 in fees, for an annual percentage rate (APR) of 290 percent. 
 
Payday lenders prey on vulnerable consumers.  Payday loan borrowers are 3 times more likely to 
be debt burdened than other consumers.  Over 60 percent of payday loan borrowers are women 
and African American households are 2.5 times more likely to use payday loans than white 
households.23 
 
Auto Title Loans Additionally, consumers may use another asset, their automobile, to obtain 
expensive, high risk auto title loans. Marketed as small, short-term emergency loans, auto title 
loans are a trap that lock borrowers in webs of debt. Auto title loans are short-term loans secured 
with the title of the borrower’s car. Most of these triple digit interest rate loans represent a small 
portion of the value of the automobile and like payday loans, there is very little verification of 
the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.  To obtain an auto title loan, borrowers give the lender 
the title to their car, rather than a paycheck, as collateral for the loan. In return, borrowers often 
are required to make a series of interest payments and a final balloon payment of the entire loan 
principal.  In addition, many auto title lenders charge a fee for every late payment.  If the loan is 
not repaid, the borrower runs the risk of losing their car, which for many workers is the only 
transportation to their place of employment. 
 
Refund Anticipation Loans  Tax preparers offer enticing but usurious refund 
anticipation loans (RAL) that are based on a taxpayer’s prospective income tax refund. Many 
lower-income families who benefit from the Federal Earned Income Tax Credit24 (EITC) lose a 
significant percent of the refund because they choose to get their tax refund via a RAL. These 
families can least afford the expensive fees involved in a RAL. The alternative is to wait for a 
short period after filing the federal tax return before receiving a check from the federal 
government for the full amount of the credit. In 2002, over one-third of all recipients of the EITC 
chose to use a refund anticipation loan.25 The Consumer Federation of America has estimated the 
                                                 
23 Westrich & Williams, 2004 
24 Approved by Congress in 1975, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable federal income tax credit for 
low-income working individuals and families. 
25 Feltner, 2005 
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total cost of tax preparation and the issuance of a refund anticipation loan at $248 for the average 
return during the 2002 tax year. This fee included a $100 fee for tax preparation, a $40 electronic 
filing fee, a $33 application and handling fee, and a $75 loan fee.26 
 
A 2005 Woodstock Institute study examined 2002 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on RALs 
in Illinois.  RAL participation rates among recipients of the federal EITC and the Illinois Earned 
Income Credit exceeded 38 percent statewide.  Further, RALs cost low- and moderate-income 
taxpaying families over $64 million in tax preparation and loan fees. In fact, the study found that 
tax preparers appear to concentrate in communities with concentrated numbers of low-income 
EITC recipients.27  As a result, not only are RALs stripping the wealth of individual tax payers—
they also take income away from lower-income communities. 
 
Overdraft Protection Overdraft protection, a product that is regularly offered to many 
bank customers as a convenience, has turned into an excessively priced loan program. Also 
known under the names “bounce protection,” “overdraft privilege,” and “bounce safe,” these 
products were intended as a courtesy service to save consumers from the embarrassment of a 
bounced check.  However, overdraft protection has evolved into a well-disguised loan product, 
the key features of which have been concealed by banks in order to extract additional fee income 
from unsuspecting consumers. These products have seized billions of hard-earned dollars 
directly from consumers’ checking accounts, all due to mistakes in balancing and an alluring but 
deceptive loan program.  
 
When a consumer makes a transaction that overdraws the funds currently in an account, the bank 
still pays for the item, but also assesses an overdraft or non-sufficient funds (NSF) fee. Among 
the seven largest Chicago area banks, this fee is between $25 and $33, with an average of $29. 
The fee is assessed for each transaction made when the account is overdrawn. According to a 
study conducted by the Woodstock Institute, the APR of bounce protection programs of Chicago 
area banks range from 1600 percent to over 3,000 percent.28  Overdraft protection is a very 
lucrative product for banks.  Total fee income from this product is over $10 billion every year.29 
 
Lower-income consumers account for most overdraft protection fee income.  According to a 
2006 study conducted by the Center for Responsible Lending, repeat overdraft protection users 
are often low-income, single, non-white renters.  In fact, the typical repeat user of overdraft 
protection services is 35-39 years old and has total household income of $30,000 to $35,000.30 
 
Credit Cards  Credit card use has exploded due to a highly successful marketing 
strategy: mass, unsolicited mail campaigns. For over two decades, banks have extended credit 
effectively to anyone with an address, regardless of their income and credit score.31 As a result, 
over the last 20 years credit card debt has almost tripled.  Further, from 2000-05 there was a 
31percent increase in credit card debt for a total of $800 billion.32 In addition to this alarming 
increase in credit card debt, consumer and community advocates take issue with many clauses 
                                                 
26 Wu & Jean Ann Fox, 2003 
27 Feltner, 2005 
28 Westrich & Bush, 2004 
29 James & Smith, April 24, 2006 
30 James & Smith, April 24, 2006 
31 Westrich & Bush, 2005 
32 Demos and Center for Responsible Lending, October 12, 2005 
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tucked into the fine print of credit card contract agreements that double or triple the interest rates 
and fees of credit cards with little warning or explanation: 
 
Minimum Payments: Banks have decreased minimum monthly payments from 5 percent of 
balances to 2-3 percent.  The consequence is that more principal and interest is revolved and 
charged during each billing cycle.33  
 
High Fees: Credit card companies are increasingly relying on income derived from fees, 
including late fees, balance transfer fees, over-the-limit fees, cash advance fees and foreign 
exchange fees.  As a result, the total revenue from fees increased almost tripled from 1995 to 
2004 to $24 billion.34 
 
High Cost Of Late Payments: Credit card companies benefit from late payments.  First, many 
increase the interest rate on a person’s card as high as 34 percent if they make a late payment.  
Second, credit card banks levy a late payment fee, typically between $29 and $39.  Third, many 
credit card banks practice universal default.  That is, they may increase the interest rate of a 
holder’s card if they are late in a payment on another unrelated debt.35  The practice began after a 
rash of bankruptcy filings in the mid-to-late 1990's and has increasingly become standard in the 
industry.36 Although credit card banks assert that universal default is warranted by the added risk 
of these consumers, critics allege that the severity of the punishment does not match the risk of 
default. Universal default has become such a growing consumer issue that the legislature of New 
York State has approved bill that would ban universal default pricing. 37  The bill was 
subsequently vetoed by Governor Pataki.38 
 
Credit card use can be especially challenging for low wage and minority households. First, they 
more often carry a credit card balance than other credit card holders.  Of those with credit cards 
in 2001, 84 percent of African-American credit card holders carried a balance and 75 percent of 
Latinos credit card holders carried a balance.  This is very troubling because credit card holders 
that carry a balance, in effect, subsidize free riders or those that pay off their balances every 
month.  In other words, higher income households are indirectly subsidized by modest income 
households.  Second, minority households tend to experience higher levels of indebtedness.  In 
2001, one-fifth of credit card indebted African-American household spent nearly 20 percent of 
their income on debt payments.  Those earning less than $50,000 a year faired even worse.  Over 
40 percent of their income was spent on debt service payments.39   
 
Subprime and Non-Traditional Loans 
 
Home ownership comprises the most valuable asset most consumers own.  Stubborn and 
persistent disparities and discrimination in home mortgage and refinance lending must be 
combated in order to create and maintain opportunities for wealth creation for lower-income and 
minority families.  
                                                 
33 Demos, June 6, 2004 
34 Demos, June 6, 2004 
35 Demos, June 6, 2004 
36 McGeehan, 2004 
37 Jalili, 2006 
38 "Pataki Blasted By Consumer Advocates And Lawmakers On His Veto Of Legislation Limiting Credit Card Rate 
Hikes," 2006 
39 Silva & Epstein, May 11, 2005 
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Subprime Mortgages and Refinance Loans In theory, a subprime loan has an interest 
rate higher than prevailing and competitive rates in order to compensate for the added risk of 
lending to a borrower with impaired credit.  Predatory loans are a subset of subprime loans.  
Predatory loans, which often result in equity stripping and inequalities in wealth, have one or 
more of the following features:  
1) Charges more in interest and fees than is required to cover the added risk of lending to 
borrowers with credit imperfections. 
2) Contains abusive terms and conditions that trap borrowers and lead to increased 
indebtedness.  These abusive terms include the sale of unnecessary products, balloon 
payments, and abusive prepayment penalties. 
3) Does not take into account the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.  
4) Provides kickbacks to brokers. 
5) Shows evidence of frequent loan flipping.  
6) Imposes mandatory arbitration.  
7) Practices fraud, including inaccurate appraisals to justify loan amounts, or inflated 
documentation of the income of borrowers. 
8) Violates fair lending laws by targeting women, minorities and communities of color.40   
 
Many borrowers that receive subprime and predatory loans qualify for prime loans.  Freddie Mac 
and Fannie Mae have estimated that a third to one-half of borrowers who qualify for market rate 
loans receive subprime loans.41,42   Subprime borrowers who would have qualified for prime 
loans pay mortgage rates on the order of 2 to 2.5 percentage points higher in the subprime 
market.  On a $200,000 financed over 30 years, the difference in interest payments at interest 
rates of 7 percent and 9 percent is over $100,000.  In neighborhoods where subprime lending is 
prevalent, this represents a loss of billions of dollars.   
 
So what explains why some consumers that have credit ratings suitable for prime loans but 
receive subprime loans?  There is abundant evidence that minority and elderly consumers are 
targeted by subprime home mortgage and refinance lenders.  NCRC examined the home 
mortgage disclosure act (HMDA) data of ten large metropolitan communities in 2004.  The 
study, which controlled for credit risk and housing market conditions, found that: 
 
• The level of refinance subprime lending increased as the portion of African-Americans in 
a neighborhood increased in nine of the ten metropolitan areas.  In the case of home purchase 
subprime lending, the African-American composition of a neighborhood boosted lending in six 
metropolitan areas. 
 
• The percent of African-Americans in a census tract had the strongest impact on subprime 
refinance lending in Houston, Milwaukee, and Detroit.  Even after holding income, 
creditworthiness, and housing market factors constant, going from an all white to an all African-
American neighborhood (100 percent of the census tract residents are African-American) 
increased the portion of subprime loans by 41 percentage points in Houston.   
 
                                                 
40 National Community Reinvestment Coalition and Rainbow/Push Coalition, 2005 
41 "Fannie Mae Vows More Minority Lending," 2000 
42 Freddie Mac, N.D. 
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• Solely because the percentage of the African-American population increased, the amount 
of subprime home purchase lending surged in Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Detroit.  From an all 
white to an all African-American neighborhood in Cleveland, the portion of subprime home 
purchase loans climbed 24 percentage points.  Similarly there was an 18 percentage point 
increased in Milwaukee and a 17 percentage point increase in Detroit.   
 
• The impact of the age of borrowers was strong in refinance lending.  In seven 
metropolitan areas, the portion of subprime refinance lending increased solely when the number 
of residents over 65 increased in a neighborhood.43 
 
NCRC also examined high cost home mortgage lending in Cincinnati.  African-Americans 
Cincinnatians received a disproportionately greater amount of subprime (high-cost) loans than 
did whites. For example, only 9.59 percent of all-single family loans to whites were subprime, 
whereas 33.23 percent of loans to African-Americans were subprime. Generally, as income level 
increases, the likelihood of subprime lending decreases dramatically. That is, while moderate-
income households (regardless of their race) in the City of Cincinnati constituted 19.06 percent 
of households, they received 40.00 percent of total subprime loans made, a ratio of 2.10.  In 
contrast, upper-income households comprised 29.94% of the City of Cincinnati’s households but 
received just 11.36% of subprime single family loans, a ratio of 0.38. 
 
Based on 2004 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, NCRC found that minorities and 
immigrants receive strikingly high numbers subprime loans despite their economic status. 
Middle and upper income borrowers in white neighborhoods received just 8.3 percent of 
subprime home purchase loans, while the same income group in immigrant neighborhoods 
received over 13.6 percent of high cost loans. Markedly, women – regardless of ethnic or racial 
make-up - received over 32.1 percent of subprime loans made to all Americans even though 
females compose only 29 percent of the nation’s households.  In contrast, women received only 
24 percent of the prime home purchase loans.44 
   
A 2005 Woodstock Institute study found that race is a more determinant factor of high cost loans 
than income.  Lower-income African-Americans in the Chicago area were just over 3 times more 
likely to receive a high cost loan than a low-income white borrower.  Moreover, an African 
American higher income borrower, earning at least twice the Area Median Income (AMI), was 
over 5 times more likely to receive a high-cost loan than a white borrower of the similar income.  
In fact, a high income African American borrower was over twice as likely to receive a high cost 
loan as a low-income white borrower.45 
 
There is further evidence that the financial status of borrowers does not totally explain patterns 
of subprime lending.  Paul Calem of the Federal Reserve, and Kevin Gillen and Susan Wachter 
of the Wharton School used credit scoring data to conduct econometric analysis scrutinizing the 
influence of credit scores, demographic characteristics, and economic conditions on the level of 
subprime lending.  Their study found that after controlling for creditworthiness and housing 
market conditions, the level of subprime refinance and home purchase loans increased in a 
                                                 
43 National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2004 
44 National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2006 
45 Smith, May 2005 
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statistically significant fashion as the portion of African-Americans increased on a census tract 
level in Philadelphia and Chicago.46 
 
In addition, women and lower-income borrowers also receive a disproportionate share of 
subprime loans.  In its 2005 study of 331 metropolitan areas, NCRC foundation that subprime 
lenders outperformed their prime lending peers in terms of issuing a higher percent of their loans 
to African-Americans, Hispanics, low-and moderate-income (LMI) borrowers, women, LMI 
census tracts, and minority census tracts.  In fact, subprime lenders reached more women in 
every single metropolitan area observed and reached more African-Americans and LMI tracts in 
98 percent of metropolitan areas observed. 
 
This concentration of subprime loans has devastating impacts on lower-income and minority 
communities due to increased and spatially concentrated foreclosures.  Foreclosures, in 
moderate- and low-income communities, turn what might typically be viewed only as a 
consumer protection problem in which an individual homeowner is overcharged or even losses 
their home, into a community development problem in which increased foreclosures lead to 
property abandonment and blight and destabilized neighborhoods.  A 2005 econometric analysis 
by the Woodstock Institute analyzed the effect of subprime mortgages on foreclosure rates in the 
Chicago region.  The study, which controlled for neighborhood demographics and economic 
conditions, concluded that subprime loans lead to a foreclosure rate nearly thirty times that of 
prime loans.  The increase in foreclosures has a significant negative effect on neighborhood 
property values.  The authors assert that foreclosures cause a decline in property values by at 
least 1.44 percent for each foreclosure within one-eighth of a mile of a house in a low- or 
moderate-income census tract. Given an average selling price of $111,002, properties in low- and 
moderate-income tracts lost nearly $1,600 in value per foreclosure for the average property.47 
 
Non-Traditional Loans While subprime loans remain a pressing public policy and 
consumer issue, the increasing use of non-traditional or exotic mortgages represent a relatively 
recent risk to asset preservation.  Over the last few years, the use of non-traditional mortgages 
has surged.  Initially offered in metropolitan areas with high cost home markets on the east and 
west coasts, these loans were made primarily to higher income consumers buying homes in 
rapidly appreciating markets.  Non-traditional mortgages include interest only mortgages and 
option adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs).  With an interest only loan, the borrower pays only the 
interest on the loan during a prescribed period, generally up to five years.  Eventually, borrowers 
begin making principal and interest payments.  Option ARMs, which are negatively amortizing 
loans, allow borrowers to make minimum payments that do not even cover the interest on the 
mortgage.  In addition, many option ARMs begin at a low or teaser interest rate, sometimes 
several basis points below the long-term APR for the loan. 
 
Non-traditional loans are increasingly popular.  Comprising only 0.5% of all mortgages in 2003, 
12.3% of mortgages were non-traditional in the first five months of 2006.  In high cost markets 
non-traditional are even more popular, comprising more than 25 percent of all new mortgages 
made in 2006 in California48 and 26 percent of loans in Naples, Florida.  In addition, the use of 
                                                 
46 Calem, Gillen & Wachter, October 30, 2002 
47 Immergluck & Smith, June 14, 2005 
48 Leonhardt, 2006 
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non-traditional loans is increasing in other markets.  In the first quarter of 2006, option ARMs 
were over half of the loans made in West Virginia and 26% of loans in Wyoming.49 
 
The main purpose of these loans is to enable consumers that cannot afford a home or a higher 
priced home, to achieve home ownership.  In theory, the borrower’s income will rise to the level 
where they will be able to make full payments required or that the housing market will increase 
allowing the borrower to refinance the loan.  However, these are risky assumptions given current 
economic conditions, increasing the possibility that a borrower of a non-traditional loan will lose 
their home and develop a negative credit history. 
 
Non-traditional loans engender several consumer challenges, especially for lower-income 
consumers who are increasingly using these products: 
 
Payment shock: Many borrowers of non-traditional products do not have sufficient income to 
pay fully amortizing loan payments.  An option ARM loan of $400,000 with minimum payments 
for the first five years can result in a 93 percent increase in monthly mortgage payments in the 6th 
year and an increase in the principal balance of 11 percent.50 
 
Suitability: These loans are often not underwritten to the borrower’s current income.  Some 
lenders underwrite to the low initial or teaser rate.  In addition, underwriters also assume that 
home prices will continue to appreciate at a higher rate, and that the borrower will be able to 
refinance the loan, and build equity, even though they have not made any principal payments on 
the loan. Consumer advocates have asked regulators to mandate that these loans be underwritten 
to the borrower’s current income and that future events should only be considered if they are 
predictable, likely and relevant.51 
 
Pricing: Savings in monthly mortgage payments for nontraditional interest-only loans are 
not as great a many borrowers believe.  The interest rates of fixed-rate interest-only mortgages 
are usually an additional one-eighth to three-eights of a percentage point than traditional 30 year 
fixed rate mortgages.  Therefore, on a 30-year $300,000 mortgage at standard fixed rate of 6.62 
percent would require monthly mortgage payments of $1,920 compared to a 6.75 percent interest 
only loan with payments of $1,687.  The total monthly savings is only $233 a month.52 In 
addition, with an ARM the interest rate is not locked in and may increase. 
 
Inadequate Information: Many consumer and community activists are concerned that 
consumers are often not aware of the nature of non-traditional loans and the risks they carry as 
well as their impact on family budgets. 
 
Lower-income consumers are particularly vulnerable to nontraditional loans.  The loans are 
being increasingly marketed to consumers who are financially stretched.  These borrowers tend 
to have very low downpayments and are more likely to have a second mortgage.53  In addition, in 
many of the markets where lower-income people reside the home values are not increasing at a 
                                                 
49 "They promise the American Dream: A home of your own -- with ultra-low rates and payments anyone can 
afford," 2006 
50 Dugan, 2006 
51 "Proposed Guidance Lacks Punch, 'Unenforcable,' Groups Say," 2006 
52 Simon, 2006 
53 Simon, 2006 
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very fast rate.  As a result, the homeowner is not building equity in the home.  Further, there are 
a growing number of option ARMs made to subprime borrowers.  In fact, an estimated $507 
billion in these loans is expected to experience interest rate increases over the next two years.54  
Further, lenders are making prime and subprime option ARMs loans to borrowers with marginal 
credit that have other risky characteristics, including high loan-to-value ratios and no income 
documentation.55 
 
Most consumers find the home buying process confusing and challenging due to the financial 
and legal complexities of mortgage finance products.  Subprime and non-traditional mortgage 
products make the home buying process even more complicated.  As a result, consumers 
experience significant difficulties weighing various mortgage products and  understanding the 
risks of their loans.  The information imbalance is weighed heavily in favor of lenders.  
Therefore, interventions such as credit counseling and home ownership counseling are crucial to 
asset development.  In addition, programs like CRF, which assist consumers experiencing 
difficulties with loans, including delinquencies and foreclosures caused by high cost fees and 
terms, are essential to enabling consumers to sustain home ownership. 
 
 
NCRC’s Consumer Rescue Fund 
 
Introduction 
 
Through the national anti-predatory lending Consumer Rescue fund (CRF), NCRC works with 
victims of predatory lenders so their mortgage payment becomes more affordable and 
foreclosure can be avoided. NCRC's member groups and their communities are an integral part 
of this program. The CRF identifies consumers who are in predatory mortgages and fixes the 
mortgages through mediation with lenders or arranging for refinance loans.56 Consumers contact 
NCRC member organizations participating in the CRF program.  In a number of instances, the 
NCRC members in the CRF program are counseling agencies assisting consumers experiencing 
delinquency and default on their loans.   
 
NCRC and over 30 participating member organizations in Arizona, Ohio and New York 
launched the CRF initiative in October 2001 to help victims of predatory loans and/or individuals 
at risk of foreclosure.  Today, the CRF has a nationwide reach, serving consumers in 17 states.   
NCRC member organizations (counseling agencies, Community Development Corporations, and 
others) identify families facing foreclosure and/or bankruptcy as a result of problematic loans.  
Fair lending specialists at NCRC then review loan documents including the Good Faith Estimate, 
income verification statements, and other forms in order to determine if the loans are in fact 
predatory.  If NCRC staff conclude that the loans are predatory, NCRC staff pursue a number of 
options.    
 
CRF intervenes in the following manners to turnaround a predatory lending situation: 
                                                 
54 Dugan, 2006 
55 Shenn, 2006 
56 HSBC North America provides refinance loans for the CRF program and supports CRF counseling.  Other 
sponsors of the CRF program include Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc, the Ford Foundation, Freddie Mac, The Fannie 
Mae Foundation, Fannie Mae, The JP Morgan Chase Foundation, and The Heron Foundation. 
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• Mediation with the lender or servicer to have abusive terms eliminated and to delay or 
stop foreclosure proceedings.  Mediation is an effective means of assisting consumers 
since it is less time consuming and resource intensive than refinancing a problematic 
loan.  Also, in a number of cases, a lender will seek to remedy an abusive loan and 
thus save the costs associated with foreclosure and other legal action.  Lenders 
themselves have often been victimized by unscrupulous brokers or aberrant loan 
officers who have made abusive loans. 
 
• An affordable refinance loan.  NCRC has partnered with HSBC North America, 
which refinances the loans of predatory lending victims.  The predatory loans are 
replaced with market-rate or below market-rate loans.  The new loans also do not 
contain prepayment penalties, balloon payments, or credit insurance.   
 
• Litigation.  If NCRC discovers a pattern and practice of abusive lending or servicing 
on the part of a financial institution, NCRC will pursue legal redress when necessary.  
NCRC has filed complaints with the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) arising from systematic abuses uncovered by the CRF program.  The 
complaint process often ends before a formal trial when a lender makes a 
commitment to change an underwriting or marketing practice. 
 
As well as re-negotiating loan terms and conditions, CRF staff negotiates over loan amounts in 
some cases.  NCRC will negotiate with lenders to help customers whose appraisals have been 
inflated or whose mortgage debt are greater than their homes’ worth because of predatory loans.  
NCRC will also attempt to have part of the loan forgiven. 
 
Another critical component of the CRF program is financial education.  Victims assisted through 
the program have numerous conversations with NCRC member organizations and NCRC fair 
lending specialists.  NCRC member organizations and staff guide them through the remediation 
process and coach them on how to avoid predatory lending situations in the future. 
 
To date, over a thousand consumers have been helped through the CRF's alternative dispute 
resolution, mediation, consumer counseling and financial education. Through this initiative, 
NCRC and its members are helping to stop mortgage lending abuses, stave off foreclosures and 
give victims a fresh start while keeping them in their homes. CRF sends a message of hope to 
those who have lost equity, security and pride—while identifying new tricks by predators and 
preparing the ground for legal action against them.  Qualifying consumers are provided CRF 
assistance free of charge. 
 
The CRF program has been instrumental in influencing best practices and public policies.  As 
described below, the CRF program has contributed to best practices and reforms in the servicing 
of subprime loans, strengthened fair lending enforcement applied to brokers, federal regulatory 
policy regarding state laws, and best practices and alternative dispute resolution regarding 
appraisals.  
 
The CRF program will mediate loans made in any state.  Refinancing services are currently 
available in the following 17 states: 
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Alabama  
Arizona 
California  
Florida  
Georgia  
Illinois  
Indiana  
Maryland  
Massachusetts  
Nevada  
New York  
North Carolina  
Ohio  
Pennsylvania  
Rhode Island  
Texas  
Wisconsin 
 
Data Analysis and Case Studies 
 
The next sections of the report include data analysis and case studies.  The data analysis involves 
a sample of loans in the CRF program.  The analysis reviews demographic characteristics of the 
borrowers and their neighborhoods, various types of abuses, the interest rates before and after the 
refinances, and the equity saved for the borrowers in the sample.  Then, the case studies provide 
vivid detail of the multiple nature of the lending abuses that lead to foreclosure and bankruptcy.   
 
The data in this report is not intended to be a representative sample of the characteristics of 
predatory lending in the United States or all the CRF cases since 2001.  This paper is a first 
attempt to study and analyze the characteristics of predatory loans in the CRF program.  NCRC 
intends to enhance the analysis in the future with more robust statistical methods and larger 
samples.  Nevertheless, NCRC believes that this first attempt provides valuable information 
about the attributes of predatory lending and also contributes to the development of 
programmatic and policy recommendations. 
 
CRF Sample and Data Analysis 
  
The following sample of CRF loans includes 112 cases.  This paper also includes a second 
sample of 69 cases, which provides detail on payment burdens associated with abusive loans.  At 
this point, the CRF data collection effort has been more geared towards assisting consumers and 
closing cases, as opposed to focusing on research.  In future years, NCRC will endeavor to 
standardize the information collected and increase its research utility. 
 
The dataset with 112 cases contains demographic and financial characteristics of these borrowers 
includes the following information: 
- borrower’s name  
- borrower’s address (removed here for privacy reasons, but the address was geocoded to a 
census tract category). 
- income and minority level of the neighborhood where the borrower resides 
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- old and new monthly mortgage payments 
- old and new interest rate 
- loan amount 
- lender’s name 
- year the new CRF loan was funded.  
 
Demographics 
 
Graph 1 shows that the majority of borrowers live in New York and Ohio.  In particular, more 
than half of the borrowers live in New York and 11.6% live in Ohio.  New York and Ohio were 
among the first states in which the CRF originally operated; community groups in these states 
remain especially active in identifying victims of predatory lending.    
 
 
Distribution of Cases by State 
 
State NY OH FL NC TX VA GA MD PA CA IL IN MA NJ NV TN WI N/A Total 
Number 62 13 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 112 
Percent 55.4 11.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 6.3 100 
 
The years 2004 and 2005 were the most productive years for the program in this particular 
sample: 56 loans were funded in 2004 and 25 cases in 2005.  The totals for 2004 and 2005 
constituted 73% of all loans refinanced in the sample (see Graph 2). 
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The CRF sample suggests that abusive lenders targeted minority neighborhoods, minority 
borrowers, low- and moderate-income neighborhoods and low- and moderate-income borrowers.  
Graph 3 shows the distribution of the cases by income and minority level of neighborhood 
(census tracts) for the sample of 112 loans.  More than half (55.4%) of the borrowers resided in 
substantially minority census tracts (more than half the population in the census tract was 
minority according to the 2000 census).  In contrast, only about 15.4% of the owner-occupied 
housing units across the country were contained in substantially minority tracts.  The CRF 
sample, therefore, included a disproportionately large percentage of borrowers residing in 
Graph 2 
Graph 1 
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minority tracts.  The finding that CRF borrowers disproportionately lived in minority 
neighborhoods is consistent with previous research discussed above that high cost lending was 
targeted to minority neighborhoods.57  Since minority neighborhoods have received an excessive 
portion of high cost lending, it is likely that minority neighborhoods experience a 
disproportionate amount of abusive lending as documented by the CRF sample.  
 
Table 4 reveals that the great majority of the borrowers in the CRF sample of 112 cases were 
African-American.  About 77% of the borrowers in the CRF sample were African-American, 
17% were white, and 3% were Hispanic.  Most of the borrowers in the CRF sample were 
minorities residing in minority neighborhoods. 
 
The CRF sample also revealed that a plurality of the victims of predatory lending lived in low- 
and moderate-income neighborhoods.  About 6% of the borrowers resided in low-income 
neighborhoods and 41% lived in moderate-income neighborhoods as shown in Table 3.  Across 
the country, only 1.6% of the owner-occupied housing units were in low-income census tracts 
and just 15% were in moderate-income census tracts according to the 2000 census.  The finding 
that borrowers in low- and moderate-income tracts were targeted by abusive lenders in the CRF 
sample is also consistent with previous research documenting a disproportionate amount of high 
cost lending in these census tracts.58  Borrowers in neighborhoods receiving a disproportionate 
amount of high cost lending are more susceptible to predatory lending.  Abusive lenders take 
advantage of the absence of robust competition by issuing predatory loans. 
 
A significant portion (28.6%) of the victims in the CRF sample lived in middle-income tracts.  
However, unlike the situation for borrowers in low- and moderate-income census tracts, the 
portion of victims in middle-income tracts (28.6%) was less than the portion of owner-occupied 
housing units (54.7%) in middle-income tracts.   
 
Graph 3       
       
Distribution of Cases by Minority Level of 
Neighborhood  
Distribution of Cases by Income 
Level of Neighborhood 
       
Minority Level of 
Neighborhood Number Percent  
Income Level of 
Neighborhood Number Percent 
Not substantially minority 38 33.93%  Low 7 6.25%
Substantially minority 62 55.36%  Moderate 46 41.07%
N/A 12 10.71%  Middle 32 28.57%
Total 112 100.00%  Upper 15 13.39%
    N/A 12 10.71%
    Total 112 100.00%
 
 
 
                                                 
57 See, for example, Homeownership and Wealth Impeded, NCRC, PRRAC, and the Opportunity Agenda, April 
2006, http://www.ncrc.org/policy/analysis/policy/2006/2006-04-20_NCRC-OA-PRRACReport.pdf.  See pages 17-
19 and 23. 
58 See the Homeownership and Wealth Impeded report and page numbers cited above. 
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The majority of CRF borrowers were low- and moderate- income people.  In particular, 51 
borrowers (83.6%) out of 61 total (for which income information was available) had incomes 
below $45,000 (see Graph 5).  In addition, 20 victims (or just over 30%) had incomes below 
$25,000.   Only 10 borrowers had incomes above $45,000 among whom 5 borrowers had 
incomes in the range between $45,000 and $55,000. In sum, most of the borrowers were low- 
and moderate-income and almost half the borrowers resided in low- and moderate-income census 
tracts. 
Graph 5   
   
Distribution of Cases by Income of 
Borrower 
   
Income of Borrower Number Percent 
less than $15,000 6 9.84%
$15,001-25,000 14 22.95%
$25,001-35,000 16 26.23%
$35,001-45,000 15 24.59%
$45,001-55,000 5 8.20%
$55,001-65,000 2 3.28%
$65,001-75,000 1 1.64%
$75,001-85,000 2 3.28%
Total 61 100.00%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4 
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Wealth Stripped and Equity Saved 
 
In order to evaluate the program’s impact on preserving equity, NCRC evaluated the interest 
rates of the previous predatory loans and compared them to the new refinance loans issued 
through the CRF program (see Graph 6).  
 
In the sample of 112 cases, the loan amount ranged from $8,000 to about $400,000.  The median 
principal amount of the loans was approximately $157,000.  The mortgage rates of the previous 
predatory loans ranged between 5.5% and 17%.  The median prior mortgage rate was 9.38%.   
 
Graph 6        
Analysis of loan terms before and after refinance 
        
  
 Principal 
Amount  
Prior 
Mortgage 
Rate 
New 
Mortgage 
Rate 
% points 
difference 
Old 
Monthly 
Payment 
 New 
Monthly 
Payment  
$ 
Savings 
Average $156,986.2 9.58% 5.74% 3.84% $1,198.4 $922.0 $276.5
             
Median $161,280.4 9.38% 6.00% 3.38% $1,165.8 $941.7 $224.1
 
The interest rates of the refinance loans were considerably lower than the rates of the previous 
predatory loans.  The new loans had interest rates ranging between 1% and 8%.  The median rate 
of the new refinance loans rate was 6.00%.  The difference between the median rate of the 
previous loans (9.38%) and the new loan (6%) was 3.38 percentage points, which results in 
substantial amount of equity saved over the life of a loan.   
 
CRF customers have been able to save millions of dollars of wealth by refinancing out of abusive 
loans.  The average monthly payment was $1,198 for the abusive loans.  For the new refinance 
loans, the average monthly payment was only $922.  As a result of the refinancing, the average 
monthly savings was $276.50, which equates to $3,318 annually.   Assuming a 30 year loan 
term, the total savings on an average loan would be $100,000.  Given that the CRF program has 
assisted at least 1,000 victims through either refinancing or loan modifications, the program has 
saved borrowers approximately $100 million in equity.   
 
Abusive Loans Beyond Repayment Ability 
 
Another sample of 69 CRF cases included calculations of the monthly housing payment-to-
income ratio (front-end ratio) and the monthly total debt-to-income ratio (back-end ratio). 
 
The front-end and back-end ratios of the predatory loans in the CRF sample were considerably 
higher than common limits in standard underwriting guidelines.  The average front-end ratio was 
about 41% and the median was 35.4%.  The average back-end ratio was 50.3% and the median 
was about 50% (see Graph 7).  Standard front-end and back-end ratios for prime loans are 28% 
and 36%, respectively.  The considerably higher ratios of the predatory loans in the CRF sample 
suggest that the loans were beyond the consumers’ abilities to repay, leading to financial distress 
and/or bankruptcy and foreclosure.     
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Graph 7   
Debt-to-income Ratios 
  Front-end Ratio Back-end Ratio 
Average 40.77% 50.28%
Median 35.43% 49.78%
 
 
Compounding the high front- and back-end ratios was the fact that most of the loans in the CRF 
sample did not have escrows covering property tax payments and hazard insurance.  Two thirds 
of the borrowers in the CRF sample did not have escrow accounts.  On top of housing payments 
and debt levels that were unsustainable, a number of the CRF borrowers experienced payment 
shock when they discovered that they had thousands of additional dollars in taxes and hazard 
insurance payments that were not covered by the loans.   
 
Predatory Loan Characteristics – What has Changed and What has Stayed the Same 
 
Since the inception of the CRF in 2001, abusive lenders have adapted their tricks and traps.  
Some of the core tricks such as fee packing (charging very high fees that strip equity) have 
remained constant.  Another constant is interest rates and fees that are not justified by risk (as 
reflected in a consumer’s credit score). 
   
Predatory lenders, however, have discarded a number of tricks that have received much public 
criticism from public officials, regulators, and community activists.  CRF staff, for example, 
report that single premium credit insurance is considerably less frequent than it was a few years 
ago.  Premiums for insurance covering disability, job loss, or death were added to the loan 
amount; interest was assessed for 30 years for these insurance products that often provided 
coverage for only five years.  Another abusive practice, mandatory arbitration (requiring 
borrowers to use arbiters instead of the courts) has also appeared less frequently in loans than in 
previous years.  Finally, violations of the federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
(HOEPA) are less common.   The good news is that much of the decrease of these particular 
abuses can be attributed to a consensus among industry, regulatory officials, and community 
groups to rid loans of these practices. 
 
The bad news is that a number of other abusive practices are on the increase.  Excessive yield 
spread premiums (or payments to brokers for securing higher interest rates than the lender would 
normally charge) are on the rise according to CRF staff.  Appraisal fraud has also been 
increasing.   
 
The other abusive practices that are on the increase include: 
 
• Misrepresentation to consumer – Documents required to be shared shortly after a 
borrower’s application are not shared by the lender until the closing date.  These include 
the Good Faith Estimate (GFE), disclosures of the Annual Percentage Rate (APR), 
finance charges, and other items mandated by the Truth in Lending Act, and a document 
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indicating if servicing rights are being transferred (in other words, if the lender/broker 
will fund or sell the loan).  The unscrupulous lender will also not establish escrow 
accounts for taxes or insurance payments and/or will not discuss the costs of taxes and 
insurance payments.  These payments add substantial amounts to monthly costs and can 
create substantial financial distress if the borrower is not prepared for them.  The 
incidence of misrepresentation has increased because a lack of transparency by the lender 
is harder to discover by agencies/lawyers trying to assist the borrowers.  For example, it 
is relatively easy to put a date on a GFE that is close to the time of the borrower’s 
application, although the GFE was not provided until closing.     
 
• Exotic Mortgages – Risky loan products, commonly known as exotic mortgages, have 
increased because housing costs increased.  Unscrupulous lenders are trying to concoct 
methods to qualify borrowers for homes they cannot afford or can barely afford.  Stated-
income loans forego the usual documentation of a borrower’s income level through pay 
stubs and tax returns.  Using stated-income loans, abusive lenders/brokers can readily 
inflate incomes to quality borrowers for unaffordable loans.  Abusive lenders are also 
qualifying borrowers for option Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) loans using initial 
rates as low as 1%.  In addition, unscrupulous lenders are underwriting loans using lower 
monthly payments that cover only interest payments on “interest” only loans.  This type 
of underwriting will eventually present unaffordable situations for borrowers when they 
need to start paying principal and interest after the expiration of the interest-only payment 
period on interest only loans or after the expiration of the initial low rates on option ARM 
loans.   
 
Finally, piggyback loans are becoming increasingly common.  A lender will combine an 
interest only or option ARM first lien loan with a second lien (or piggyback loan).  The 
piggyback loan is often a home equity line of credit (HELOC).  The piggyback loan is 
usually more expensive than private mortgage insurance (PMI) that would be required if 
the piggyback loan was not made.  Risk layering of a number of exotic features – 
interest-only, option ARMs, piggyback HELOCs, high loan-to-values, stated income – is 
a recipe for financial disaster for borrowers with limited incomes and/or imperfect credit. 
 
• Abusive Servicing Practices – In recent years, servicer abuses have climbed.  Servicers 
may or may not own the loans; they process borrower payments, verify that the 
borrowers have homeowners’ insurance and perform other administrative functions.  
Abusive servicers do not record borrower payments that are received so that they can 
charge high late fees.  Another predatory practice is forced placed insurance, or assigning 
expensive homeowners’ insurance policies to borrowers whom the servicers allege do not 
have insurance.  According to CRF staff, the force placed insurance can cost as much as 
$2,500 as opposed to $900 for standard policies. 
 
The list immediately below provides a catalogue of the abuses borrowers in the CRF program 
have encountered.  What is alarming is the number of abuses and their ingenuity and variety.   
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Abuses 
 
Description 
 
asset-based lending Lenders evaluate a loan application by looking only at the quality 
of the security or equity, and not at the ability of the borrower to 
repay the loan 
forced placed insurance Servicer assigns hazard insurance to borrower, coverage is 
usually much more expensive 
HOEPA loan A loan with a very high interest rate and/or fees that is covered 
by federal consumer protections. Predators violate the legal 
protections of HOEPA loans. 
Mandatory arbitration Stipulation that a borrower cannot sue a lender in a court of law, 
but must use an arbiter 
prepaid credit insurance Insurance financed into the loan that would cover mortgage 
payments in a case of disability, unemployment, death.  Much 
more expensive than paying monthly outside of loan 
abuse of right to cancel Abusive practices that make it hard for a consumer to cancel a 
mortgage (ie. abusing right of rescission) 
abusive collection practices Aggressive tactics of collecting late payments 
default interest rate Increasing interest rate in case of delinquency  
excessive prepayment 
penalty 
Excessive fee for paying off a mortgage before its maturity 
insincere co-signers Adding insincere co-signers to the application in order to inflate 
the income of the borrowers. Abusive lenders will add children 
and other insincere co-signers who cannot contribute to loan 
payments.   
loans made in excess of 
100% LTV 
When the loan amount exceeds the fair market value of the 
home 
negative amortization Loan product that requires a monthly payment that does not fully 
amortize a mortgage loan, thereby increasing the loan’s principal 
balance  
flipping Persuading a borrower to refinance a loan repeatedly in order to 
charge high points and fees each time the loan is refinanced 
fraud Example: Forging signatures on loan documents 
lack of TNB Lack of tangible net benefits that justify the origination of a new, 
higher-balance and high-cost loan 
targeting/discrimination Cases when lenders specifically market predatory loans to 
customers based on race, ethnicity, or age 
predatory appraisal Overestimating the market value of the house 
balloon payment A mortgage that has level monthly payments over a stated term 
but which provides for a large lump-sum payment to be due at 
the end of an previously specified term 
equity stripping A case when a homeowner’s equity is reduced due to repeatedly 
refinancing, high fees, and other abuses 
home improvement scam Home improvement costs financed into the mortgage usually 
paid by a lender to a home improvement contractor directly. 
misrepresentation Misrepresentation of loan terms to a borrower 
falsified application Falsifying loan applications (particularly income level or adding 
insincere co-signers, etc.) 
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Stated income Not requiring full documentation of income from tax forms and 
paystubs.  Reduced documentation or stated income loans 
increase the chances of fraud. 
yield spread premium Fee paid by lenders to brokers for loans carrying interest rates 
above a par rate 
abusive servicing practices Servicers not recording payments, force placing insurance, 
applying high late fees, etc. 
unfair terms High interest rates and loan terms not justifiable by risk 
(consumer’s credit score) 
fee packing Charging undisclosed, improper, and high fees 
 
 
Borrowers can sometimes deal with abusive loans and make payments on time despite the 
financial burden involved.  The CRF program, however, has assisted a number of borrowers who 
have experienced temporary hardship and emergency medical issues that make an abusive loan 
an unsustainable burden. If the abuses had not occurred and the loan had been a responsible 
prime or subprime loan, the temporary hardship could be overcome.  For example, the borrower 
could have negotiated a forbearance plan with the lender.  In the case of predatory lenders, in 
contrast, the borrower has no opportunity to work with the lender in salvaging the situation.  
Abuses turn the temporary hardship into a financial catastrophe.  The next section presents a 
number of case studies, some of which involve temporary hardships and abusive lending. 
 
CRF Case Studies 
 
The CRF case studies below illustrate vividly the nature and extent of abuses on predatory loans.  
In some cases, the CRF program was able to provide financial relief and save homes by 
arranging for a refinance loan through HSBC North America.  In other cases, the situation is still 
pending.  But in still other cases, the CRF program was not able to provide assistance; the 
predatory loan was so abusive that even below market-rate refinancing was not viable.59  While 
tragic, the inability to provide assistance on some cases illustrates the financial disaster that 
predatory lending imposes upon families and neighborhoods.  The names of the consumers and 
lenders have been fictionalized for privacy reasons.  The circumstances of the loans have not 
been changed. 
 
Case Study 1 – Brooklyn, New York 
 
Predatory or Problematic Nature: Exorbitant rate, predatory default provision. 
 
Ms. Rosepetal is an African-American mother of two young children. She has lived in her home 
in Brooklyn for over twenty years, and took sole ownership of the home when her husband 
passed away in 1995. The home is a four-unit building; Ms. Rosepetal occupies one of the units 
with her children and had tenants that occupied the other three units. From these tenants she 
received $2,060 monthly in rental income. Ms. Rosepetal was also employed as a secretary for a 
health care company and earned an annual salary of $20,522 ($1,710 monthly). Following the 
passing of her husband, she received Social Security survivor benefits for one son of around 
$500 monthly. Thus, in total, her monthly income was around $4,270. 
                                                 
59 In a number of CRF intake cases, the mismatch between income levels and home values are just too great, 
meaning that refinance loans are not possible. 
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In 1991, Ms. Rosepetal consolidated some home repair debts into a home equity loan for $91,000 
from Acme Funding. Despite the fact that she had a good credit rating, Acme gave her a 15-year 
loan at an exorbitant interest rate of 14.75 percent (as reported by Freddie Mac, the average rate 
for a 15-year loan was a much lower 8.75 percent at that time). With these terms, Ms. 
Rosepetal’s monthly payment was $1,654.92, which was a burdensome 38.75 percent of her 
monthly income.  The Rosepetal family was able to make these payments until long after Mr. 
Rosepetal passed. In 2002, Ms. Rosepetal had problems with non-paying tenants and had to evict 
one of them. Because of this loss of income, Ms. Rosepetal was unable to make payments on the 
loan, and her home went into foreclosure in January 2002. At that time, she filed for bankruptcy 
in an emergency attempt to avoid foreclosure. However, the loan through Acme had a default 
provision that increased the interest rate from an already high 14.75 percent to as outrageous 
24.00 percent as a result of the foreclosure. 
 
In April 2002, Ms. Rosepetal contacted CRF staff, which got to work collecting documents on 
her case. She received a refinance loan through the CRF program, which gave her a new loan for 
$113,319 at an interest rate of 7.00 percent. As a result, her new monthly payment is $753.60, a 
difference of $901.32 from her old payment of $1,654.92 and a much more manageable amount. 
In addition to this reduction, Ms. Rosepetal received a much lower rate, and severed her 
relationship with the shifty Acme Inc.  
 
Case Study 2 – Long Island, NY 
 
Predatory or Problematic Nature: Steering, shoddy construction, misrepresentation, inflated 
appraisal. 
 
Mr. and Ms. Gladiolus are an African-American couple living on Long Island. At the time of the 
incident, the Gladioluses had an annual income of $59,448 ($4,954 monthly), a moderate income 
given the cost of living in Long Island. In 1996, the Gladioluses saw a newspaper advertisement 
from Smith Homes, a developer building homes in the town of Brookhaven. The Gladioluses 
contacted Mr. Smith about the possibility of building a home. Mr. Smith showed them several 
properties; later, the Gladioluses believed he steered them to a lot in a predominantly minority 
neighborhood. Furthermore, Mr. Smith assured the Gladioluses about many features of their new 
house and its mortgage: a government subsidy towards the downpayment; the first years’ taxes 
free; a construction package that included high-end cabinetry, appliances, vanities, counters, tile, 
landscaping, and an alarm system. Mr. Smith also assured them that the neighborhood was free 
of drug-dealing and prostitution.  
 
Based on Mr. Smith’s descriptions, the Gladioluses agreed to purchase the ranch-style home for 
$150,000. They signed a contract to purchase the land, building, and other improvements. The 
Gladioluses did not know that Mr. Smith had arranged for a false appraisal report, which over-
valued the property and offered it to the Gladioluses at a substantially higher rate than its fair-
market value. Furthermore, Mr. Smith told them that in order to complete the transaction they 
would be required to obtain a loan from a lender of Mr. Smith’s choice. The Gladioluses closed 
on the home in February of 1997. Mr. Smith selected Acme Mortgage, which offered a 30-year 
mortgage for $145,000 at an APR of 10.625 percent. The points, fees, and yield-spread premium 
(YSP, or fee paid to the broker) totaled $2,378.60. Total fees were 6 percent of the loan value, an 
unusually high amount, given that fees typically total 1 percent on prime mortgages (In fact, 
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have pledged not to purchase loans with fees exceeding 5 percent 
of the loan amount).   Their monthly mortgage payment was $1,159.54. 
  
The Gladioluses moved in shortly thereafter and found several problems with their new home. 
The quality of construction was shoddy: some of the walls began to crack, the boiler didn’t work 
properly, and they experienced electrical problems. Furthermore, Mr. Smith did not come 
through with any of the incentives promised to them, including the rebate and cancellation of 
taxes. Mr. Smith did not respond when the Gladioluses reported these problems. Moreover, Mr. 
Smith operated several different companies which handled the sales, construction, and other 
functions. It was not clear which entity was in charge of what function.  
 
After the first year of the loan, the monthly payment increased significantly. Not until 2004 did 
the Gladioluses begin to experience difficulty in making timely and complete payments. It was 
around this time that they contacted the CRF, which went to work collecting documents. The 
CRF negotiated a 30-year refinance loan at 6.99 percent. This lowered their monthly mortgage 
payment considerably and saved the family’s home.  
 
Case Study 3 – Dayton, Ohio 
 
Predatory or Problematic Nature: Excessive fees, misrepresentation by broker, possible over-
appraisal. 
 
Mr. and Mrs. Tulip are an elderly couple living on a fixed income with little savings. At the time 
of the incident, they lived in a modest home in a small town outside Dayton, Ohio. Their 
monthly income was $4,038.53, which includes SSI benefits. In December of 1999, with their 
savings slowly running out and their ability to pay slowly dwindling, the Tulips refinanced their 
home.  
 
This refinance mortgage covered the original mortgage on their house, some consumer debt, and 
allowed them a small amount of cash out ($2,963). The new mortgage they received was for 20 
years with a principal of $189,125, and carried an APR of 10.863 percent. It thus had a monthly 
payment of $1,234.64, Their loan agreement dated December 9, 1999 indicates that their fees 
were to be 5.5 points (that is, 5.5 percent of the loan), an excessive amount which is much 
greater than the typical 1 percent of a prime loan (Also, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 
pledged not to purchase loans with fees exceeding 5 percent of the loan amount).  At the signing, 
the Tulips’ broker told the couple that he had to leave to get to another closing, and did not have 
time to fully explain the terms to them or let them read the contract. When the Tulips hesitated, 
the broker told them that they had nothing to worry about and would explain the terms later. 
When the Tulips called in the ensuing days to reach him, their calls were not returned. 
 
In 2002, the Tulips were not able to keep up with their payments and filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
to avoid foreclosure. At that time, their lender voluntarily modified the mortgage (over two years 
after the closing) to a principal balance of $129,000, based on a new appraisal. This led the 
Tulips to believe that the home was overappraised at the time of the refinance in December 1999. 
Nevertheless, this modification lowered the monthly payment by over $400 and allowed the 
Tulips to stay in their house. However, their fixed income was still not enough to keep up with 
their expenses and they filed for bankruptcy again in 2003, this time Chapter 13.  
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Case Study 4 – Cleveland, Ohio 
 
Predatory or Problematic Nature: Abusive balloon payment, possible overappraisal. 
 
Mr. and Mrs. Marigold are an elderly couple living in a house in a low-income neighborhood of 
Cleveland, Ohio. Their monthly income at the time was $2,824. They lived in their home for 
over twenty years, and in 1999 received a refinance for a better rate. This new loan was a 30-year 
mortgage for $67,500 (based on the value of the home given by an appraiser) with an APR of 
11.6 percent. The monthly payment on this mortgage was $642. 
 
Mr. Marigold fell ill and had to pay large medical bills, causing the Marigolds to miss several 
payments on their mortgage starting in January 2001. In late 2003, their lender began foreclosure 
proceedings. At the last minute, the Marigolds entered a forbearance agreement under which 
they would continue to pay their regular monthly payment, despite the fact that they had missed 
almost two years’ worth of payments. However, this agreement was on the condition that the 
arrearages, with interest, would become due on April 5, 2004.  
 
Mr. Marigold attempted to refinance out of this situation, both through his original lender and 
with other lenders, in December 2003. He had hoped to find a mortgage to pay off his principal 
balance and the additional balloon payment. He was dismayed to have his property appraised at a 
value of $59,000, substantially lower than the appraisal of $67,500 he received when refinancing 
in 1999. As the new appraisal indicates that property values in the area were stable, it is likely 
that the refinance in 1999 was fraudulent. 
 
This balloon payment was in the amount of $29,325 which the Marigolds did not have the funds 
to pay. At this time, the Marigolds’ lender contacted the Consumer Rescue Fund, which got to 
work collecting documents on the loan. The CRF was able to extend the Marigolds a loan to 
cover both the original amount and the additional balloon payment, in the total of $77,000. This 
loan was for 30 years and carried an APR of 6.99 percent, dramatically lower than the original 
rate of 11.6 percent. Their new monthly payment was $511, a much more manageable amount.  
 
Case Study 5 – Charlotte, North Carolina 
 
Predatory or Problematic Nature: Misrepresentation. 
 
Ms. Iris is an African-American single mother with one child living in Charlotte, North Carolina. 
At the time of the incident, she worked for US Airways and had a monthly income of $2,022. 
Ms. Iris decided in late 2004 that she wanted to purchase a newly built home in her area of town. 
After identifying a new development she liked, its builder referred her to a local mortgage broker 
from Acme, Inc. 
 
Ms. Iris met a broker from Acme and brought with her a $50 application fee. When the broker 
noticed she worked for US Airways, he successfully talked her into surrendering four “buddy 
passes” – the flight coupons that the airline offers its employees. When Ms. Iris received a 
follow-up call from her Acme loan processor, it was not about the loan itself, but instead another 
solicitation for her buddy passes. After another meeting initiated by Ms. Iris and another fee of 
$65, Ms. Iris was finally given a preapproval worksheet for a 30-year loan of $122,000 at 9.5% 
APR. Because the monthly payment, taxes, and insurance would have been out of Ms. Iris’s 
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price range, she decided to purchase a smaller townhouse home for $110,890 at 8.625% APR. 
Believing that everything was going smoothly, Ms. Iris drove by the home a few weeks later 
only to see that it was back on the market. Upset, she called the builder, who said the loan officer 
told him that she no longer wanted the property. The next day she got a call from the owner of 
the brokerage, who apologized not only for this incident but also for the buddy pass incident. He 
did not, however, offer to remunerate her for the buddy passes. 
 
When Ms. Iris finally went to the closing, several items on the disclosure forms were incorrect. 
The loan documents showed an APR of 10.0 percent, not the 8.625 percent she was expecting. 
Further, the fees she had already paid were absent from the disclosure forms. What’s worse, the 
purchase price was over three thousand dollars greater than the amount on the preapproval form. 
Nevertheless, Ms. Iris agreed to a 30-year adjustable rate mortgage for $107,235, a monthly 
payment of $941.  
 
Despite the fact that the payment was much higher than Ms. Iris anticipated, she managed to 
keep up with payments for several months. However, US Airways went into bankruptcy and 
required its employees to take a 21 percent cut in pay with little warning. She was able to catch 
up by taking a loan from her 401k retirement plan, but nevertheless was not able to sustain such 
a high payment.  
 
The Consumer Rescue Fund heard about this case in the spring of 2005 and got to work 
documenting the case. Its funder came through with an especially low APR of 3.00% on the 
original purchase price. Thus, Ms. Iris’s monthly payment was cut from an exorbitant $941.06 to 
a much more manageable $464.83. 
 
Case Study 6 – Oakland, CA 
 
Predatory or Problematic Nature: Flipping, predatory prepayment, stated income loan, mortgage 
payment out of proportion with income.  
 
Ms. Begonia is an African-American who bought a home in Oakland, California in December 
1999. At the time of the incident, her income was $47,328 annually, or $3,944 monthly. She has 
undergone a series of unnecessary refinances, each of which has added a multitude of duplicative 
fees and has inflated the amount that she owes.  
 
In December 1999, Ms. Begonia purchased her home for $108,000. Approximately nine months 
later, she underwent her first refinance, which she thought would lower her rate and allow her to 
cash out a modest amount of money for roof repairs. Instead, this new mortgage for $140,250 
stripped equity from her by paying off a prepayment penalty without her knowledge. Further, the 
Good Faith Estimate for this transaction also shows that Ms. Begonia was to be charged lender 
and broker fees of 5.76 points (5.76 percent of the loan, or $8,076), an amount much greater than 
typical prime fees of 1 percent of the loan amount (Also, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 
pledged not to purchase loans with fees exceeding 5 percent of the loan amount).  
 
In August 2001, less than a year after her first refinance, Ms. Begonia refinanced a second time.  
The new loan for $187,500 was adjustable and carried a three-year prepayment penalty. In 
October of 2003, Ms. Begonia refinanced a third time, this time a 30-year fixed loan for 
$240,000. The broker and lender fees on the Good Faith Estimate were $5,745, or 2.4 percent of 
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the loan. In this refinance, Ms. Begonia received a small amount of cash out to pay off student 
loans. She refinanced for a fourth time in July 2004. On this loan, her income was greatly 
inflated at $6,000 monthly, when it in fact was only $3,944.  Consequently, the monthly payment 
on this fourth and final refinance was $1,887, which was an overwhelming 47.87 percent of her 
income.  
 
Case Study 7 – Middle Island, New York 
 
Predatory or Problematic Nature:  Misrepresentation, steering, inflated appraisal. 
 
Mr. and Mrs. Smith are an African-American couple living in Middle Island, New York.  In 
2000, Mr. Smith responded to a local newspaper advertisement offering Burns homes for sale.  
This advertisement offered the promise of providing affordable housing to qualified individuals 
under the federally-insured  FHA program.  The Smiths responded to the advertisement and 
contacted Mr. Burns about the possibility of building and purchasing a home.  After meeting the 
Smiths, Mr. Burns steered them to purchase a home in an area with a predominantly minority 
population.  Mr. Burns then represented the home as being in a drug-free and prostitution-free 
neighborhood, with features such as high quality construction, upgraded cabinetry, vanities, 
counter tops, tile and paint, a full basement, landscaping and an alarm system. In addition, Mr. 
Burns promised them an appliance package, a government subsidy toward the mortgage, the first 
year’s taxes free, and a rebate at the end of the first year of the mortgage.    
 
The Smiths agreed to purchase the home for $197,000, and entered into a contract with Mr. 
Burns to purchase the land, buildings and improvements.  They were then told by Mr. Burns that 
in order to finalize the transaction, they would need to secure a loan from a lender of Mr. Burns’ 
choice, who selected Johnson, Inc.  The Johnson, Inc. loan came with an interest rate of 8.5% 
and monthly payments of $1942.  The Smiths combined monthly income was $7,528. 
 
The Smiths were unaware that Mr. Burns had conspired for the preparation of a false appraisal 
report that intentionally appraised the value of the property at an amount substantially higher 
than the fair market value of the property. This deception proved to be the first in a long string of 
abuses against the Smiths, as almost every one of Mr. Burns’ promises proved to be false.  The 
Smiths never received a rebate, and the house was plagued with a myriad of problems, including 
but not limited to: a cracked foundation, faulty plumbing, grading problems, and no landscaping.  
Due to a provision in the mortgage that Mr. Burns failed to explain, the monthly mortgage 
payments rose over $200, to $2187, raising there debt-to-income ratio to 29%.  They were even 
deceived about the neighborhood; despite Mr. Burns assurances, the neighborhood was 
frequented by drug dealers and prostitutes.  Although they were purportedly represented by an 
attorney prior to contract on their transaction with Mr. Burns, the attorney was selected by Mr. 
Burns.  Moreover, they were not given the opportunity to meet with this attorney prior to 
contract. 
 
When the Smith’s monthly mortgage payment increased significantly after the first year of the 
loan, they began to experience difficulty in making timely and complete payments.  The 
plaintiffs sought legal aid, and were referred to the Consumer Rescue Fund by their lawyer with 
hopes of obtaining a reduced mortgage while the law firm continued litigation.  With the help of 
the Consumer Rescue Fund at NCRC, the plaintiffs where able to secure a loan of $192,400 to 
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payoff the first mortgage in full at 7% rate, 360 month term, with new payments of $1,279/per 
month equaling $293/per month in payment savings. 
 
Case Study 8 – Akron, Ohio 
  
Predatory or Problematic Nature:  Fee packing, misrepresentation 
 
Ms. Bean, a resident of Akron, Ohio, refinanced her mortgage in March of 2000. She expected 
the transaction to improve her financial situation and her credit. However, the promises her 
broker made turned out to be empty.  
 
When Ms. Bean refinanced through a broker, she paid off her existing mortgage and a car loan. 
She was told that her new loan would reduce her monthly payments by $300. The mortgage and 
car payments combined were around $930 at the time. The new mortgage payment was $729, 
which saved Ms. Bean only about $200. When Ms. Bean asked about why the payment was 
higher than the lender had originally mentioned, she was told that it was because they had paid 
off her delinquent taxes. In fact, the disbursement for taxes was only $ 1,207, a relatively small 
amount that would not have increased the proposed payment by $100.  At the time, Ms. Bean’s 
monthly income was $3,608. 
 
This refinance also contained abusive broker fees. Ms. Bean was charged a loan discount of 
$782, broker's compensation of $4,729 and a processing fee of $125. In total, these fees were 
7.2% of the loan amount, an unusually high amount, given that fees usually total 1 percent on 
prime mortgages (Also, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have pledged not to purchase loans with 
fees exceeding 5 percent of the loan amount).  The total settlement charges amounted to 8.8% of 
the loan amount. This loan also contained a balloon feature, which Ms. Bean did not fully 
understand when refinancing.  
 
Some time after the refinance, Ms. Bean over-extended finances in an attempt to satisfy other 
outstanding consumer debts. This, in conjunction with some minor home repairs, caused her to 
take out several payday loans. The vicious cycle of fees caused Ms. Bean to eventually become 
delinquent on her mortgage. She was given a forbearance agreement, and eventually had her loan 
modified in December 2003.  
 
The loan modification, however, still contained abusive features and involved questionable 
servicing practices.  Ms. Bean’s credit report reflects that she had a thirty-day late payment, and 
that she had resolved it. No foreclosure was initiated. However, when the servicing on Ms. 
Bean’s loan transferred in July of 2005, she received a letter indicating that the outstanding 
collection costs on her account totaled $3,191. It is not understood why this amount was not 
included in the loan modification. Ms. Bean has been attempting to satisfy the outstanding 
amount by including extra funds in her monthly payment. Although her loan has been modified, 
she has had to make payments that are higher than anticipated.   
 
Ms. Bean contacted the CRF to help alleviate her financial distress.  Working together, CRF was 
able to secure Ms. Bean a new mortgage at a principle of $75,000 and an interest rate of 6.39%.  
With monthly savings totaling a hundred dollars and an improved interest rate by 1.61 
percentage points, Ms. Bean found financial relief for her predatory mortgage.  
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Case Study 9 – Peabody, MA  
 
Predatory or Problematic Nature:  Misrepresentation, Abusive Servicing, Fraud regarding 
borrower income, Inappropriate Collection Practices 
  
Ms. Lytle, a resident of Peabody, MA, obtained a refinance in October 2002 because she was 
ordered to do so in a divorce settlement.  NCRC's investigation of her 2002 finances showed her 
gross income from employment was $49,524, a monthly amount of $4,127. On her mortgage 
application, however, her gross monthly income was inflated to an amount of $4,425. Ms. Lytle 
was told by her broker that she would be getting a loan with a fixed 8% rate. However, at 
signing, she was presented with documents for an adjustable 9.75% loan. Ms. Lytle did not 
receive any preliminary disclosures to indicate that she was getting an adjustable mortgage, 
which is a violation of the Truth In Lending Act. Her mortgage application was signed and dated 
on the same day that her closing papers were, which supports this allegation. Ms. Lytle also 
never received a good faith estimate. 
  
With the higher rate, she knew she could not afford to pay for very long. When the time came to 
sign, she felt that she had no other options because she had been ordered to refinance her ex-
husband off her mortgage by the divorce court judge. She had been given 90 days to do so, and 
figured she did not have enough time to apply and close a loan with another lender. At the time 
of the application, her net income was only $2200 monthly yet she was approved for a loan with 
housing expenses of $2,100 (which includes payment, taxes, and insurance). Further, Ms. Lytle 
thought that she could later refinance her loan to a lower, market rate, but with the high payment 
she was given, no other lender could finance her. Ms. Lytle soon defaulted on her loan (July 
2003), despite her intentions to make a fresh start after her divorce. Loan Center collection 
agents have called her up to thirteen times in one day regarding her default. The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act prohibits excessive collection tactics such as this.  After the harassing calls, the 
lender commenced the foreclosure process. 
 
An additional problematic issue was the way the loan was structured, making it unaffordable.  
The initial rate on the ARM (adjustable rate mortgage) was 9.75%.  The index used in 
calculating Ms. Lytle's new rate at the time of the projected change (November 2004) was the 
six-month LIBOR, which was about 1.5789. Historically, this index has not gone low enough for 
Ms. Lytle's rate to change for the better, and if it were to change today, the loan’s APR would 
increase to 11.125%.  Coupled with the fraud on the application, this ARM structure indicated a 
blatant disregard of Ms. Lytle's ability to pay. 
 
Ms. Lytle contacted the CRF, hoping that they could help refinance her mortgage.  Fortunately, 
the CRF was able to help Ms. Lytle, and secured for her a new mortgage at a principle of 
$210,000 and interest rate of 6.99%.  At 2.76 percentage points lower than her previous rate, Ms. 
Lytle not only saved over four hundred dollars a month, but also no longer had to fear interest 
rates rising to double-digit levels.   
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Case Study 10 – Austin, TX 
 
Predatory or Problematic Nature:  Misrepresentation, Lack of Escrow Account, Pricing beyond 
Risk, Inflated Appraisal 
 
Ms. Stanton of Austin, TX is a single mother of three children who refinanced her home 
mortgage in August of 2002 because she wanted to take advantage of lower rates. Before the 
refinance, her mortgage at the time was at 8% fixed, and her total monthly payment was $746, of 
which $403 was principal and interest. When Ms. Stanton refinanced, she took a small amount of 
cash out and paid down a credit card. She was told that her rate would be lowered, and that her 
new mortgage payment would be $746. Ms. Stanton believed that this new payment, like her 
former one, would include taxes and insurance. She thought that she would be paying down the 
credit card and that her payment would be virtually the same.  
 
At the time of Ms. Stanton's signing, she believed that her new lender, Absolute Loans, would be 
collecting for taxes and insurance. Her financial difficulties began when her taxes came due and 
she was unprepared to pay them. It was only then, some time after her loan closed, that she 
reviewed her loan documents and found that she had a 14.35% interest rate.  
 
A review of her credit report shows the extreme financial strain she had been under. Several new 
collections had been added in the past few months from credit cards, because she had attempted 
to pay her mortgage company, Absolute Loans, before anything else.  Her credit profile before 
this mortgage showed moderate problems, but nothing that would cause Absolute Loans to 
charge her the exorbitant 14.35% interest rate. She also had three different HUD 1 disclosure 
forms for the loan, and she did not know which one was valid.  
 
Ms. Stanton's mortgage application showed a monthly income of $1,883. Ms. Stanton has 
verified that this was accurate at the time. Her total housing expense was calculated at $945.40. 
This was 50.2% of her gross income, whereas 30% is considered reasonable. Ms. Stanton's loan 
application shows some inconsistencies: her three children were not listed on the application 
even though they had always lived with their mother. Also, the original cost of her home was 
shown as $89,000, while Ms. Stanton actually purchased it for $54,959. Ms. Stanton believes 
that her home was overappraised at $88,000, and that the information on her application was 
made up to support the overappraisal. 
 
Another aspect of the unaffordability of Ms. Stanton's mortgage was the actual terms of the loan. 
Her note showed an initial interest rate of 14.35%. Her loan's interest rate was due to change on 
September of 2006.  The loan's rate would never be lower than 14.35%, and over its life could 
increase to as high as 21.35%. These terms were especially oppressive when compared to the 
mortgage she had before.  
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Case Study 11 – Lakeland, Florida 
 
Predatory or Problematic Nature:  Misrepresentation, Pricing beyond Risk, Inflating Borrower 
Income, Excessive Prepayment Penalty 
 
Ms. Davis of Lakeland, Florida obtained a refinance in the fall of 2003. Her intention was to 
obtain enough cash out to pay off a car loan she had at the time. She obtained about $21,000 cash 
out as she planned, but got into a bad loan in the process.  
 
One of the troubling aspects of Ms. Davis's loan was that she was charged excessive fees. Her 
HUD 1 shows $5406 (4%) being charged to discount the rate, a lender's charge of $150 for 
document preparation and $535 for processing. Ms. Davis never received a Good Faith Estimate 
or any other initial disclosures. Instead, she was told by a Brightside Loan’s representative that 
she would be getting better than 6.375% with two points. Not receiving disclosures is a violation 
of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).  She was also instructed to falsify the 
dates on some of the documents she signed at closing by indicating that they were signed earlier 
than they were.  
 
At the time of Ms. Davis's application, she was also told that she would close within a week. 
When this time came, she called the Brightside Loans office because she was concerned that she 
did not have documentation indicating what her rate and terms would be. She spoke with her 
loan officer, who indicated that Brightside Loans had to again determine her credit and that her 
score had dropped because of that. There should have been no reason for her loan officer to pull 
her credit again, and even so, her score could not have dropped significantly from a few 
inquiries.  Ms. Davis was told that her loan was now subprime, and that her loan would have 
either a higher rate or higher fees. While she was upset, she was afraid that she would not be able 
to afford her current mortgage payment along with her car loan for very long, so she opted to 
continue so that she would get the cash out. CRF staff analyzed Ms. Davis's credit and concluded 
that she could have been "referred-up" to a better loan product. Her credit file included a minor 
amount of credit card debt and her mortgage. There were a few derogatory items, which were all 
medical collections. These collections should not have been given much weight in her 
qualification process.  
 
Another problematic issue with Ms. Davis's loan was that her income was inflated on her 
application. At the time, Ms. Davis was making $12.55 an hour, working forty hours per week. 
Her base pay was therefore $2,175 per month. She also averaged about an extra $100 per month 
in overtime.  Her mortgage application, however, listed her monthly income as $2,416. Ms. 
Davis's employer recently cut her hours to 36 per week. This had caused her additional financial 
hardship, but she had managed to remain current on her mortgage.  On top of all the abuses, Ms. 
Davis had an excessive 5 year prepayment penalty. 
 
Influencing Best Practices and Public Policy 
 
While offering invaluable help to several hundred consumers and families, the CRF program has 
also achieved a national impact by influencing industry-wide practices, reforms, and federal 
policy.  One important area of influence has been the servicing of high-cost subprime loans.  As 
described above, CRF consumers have encountered a number of abuses in the servicing of their 
loans including force-placed insurance and the on-time payments not being recorded by 
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servicers.  After encountering widespread abuses of this nature, NCRC challenged fee-based 
servicers to reform their practices.  These discussions with servicers also influenced the federal 
guidelines on servicing that were developed by the Federal Trade Commission a few years ago.   
 
In 2002, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) proposed changing its regulation implementing 
the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA) to prohibit state-chartered thrifts and 
mortgage companies from ignoring state law regarding prepayment penalties and late fees as 
applied to adjustable rate mortgages and other types of so-called “alternative” mortgagers.  Using 
a sample of CRF loans, NCRC was able to document onerous prepayment penalties and abusive 
fees levied by these lenders.  When the OTS issued its final rule prohibiting state-chartered 
institutions from evading state law on prepayment penalties and late fees, the OTS cited NCRC’s 
evidence of abuses culled from the CRF program.60  
 
More recently, the CRF program, as documented above, has uncovered a pattern of appraisal 
fraud.  In a report issued during 2005 entitled, Predatory Appraisals: $tealing the American 
Dream, NCRC documented that in 54 CRF cases experiencing appraisal fraud, 65% of the cases 
involved fraudulent appraisals inflating home values by 15% to 50% and another 22% of the 
cases had faulty appraisals inflating home values 50% to 100%.  The great majority of borrowers 
in this sample experienced monthly mortgage costs increasing 20% or more due to the inflated 
appraisals.  The CRF cases and other research of widespread abuses reviewed by the study lead 
NCRC and industry partners to establish a Center for Responsible Appraisals and Valuations.61  
Lenders, appraisers, and other industry partners agree to an ethical code and also agree to submit 
disputes regarding fraudulent appraisals for arbitration.  The alternative dispute resolution of the 
Center promises to expeditiously settle cases of appraisal fraud and to promote industry-wide 
changes in practices when a critical mass of industry stakeholders participate in the Center. 
 
In addition, the CRF program continues to document the role of abusive brokers as shown by the 
case studies above.  CRF staff indicate that the majority of predatory loans in the CRF program 
are loans involving brokers.  The fee packing and targeting of minority customers in the CRF 
program suggested that brokers were involved in questionable loan practices.  Under a 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) grant, NCRC’s fair housing staff 
conducted paired testing in order to determine if the CRF cases indicated patterns and practices 
of abusive behavior.  The testing revealed pervasive discriminatory and predatory practices by 
mortgage brokers in six metropolitan areas across the country.  Between February 2005 and June 
2006, NCRC conducted over 100 tests in Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, 
Illinois; Los Angeles California; St. Louis, Missouri and the Washington, D.C. metro areas.  The 
tests found that brokers quoted different interest rates and fees on the basis of race and steered 
African-American consumers to more expensive subprime products.  The testing project lead to 
the filing of a civil rights complaint with HUD against Allied Home Mortgage Capital 
Corporation, the nation’s largest privately held mortgage broker/banker. 
 
Expansion and/or Replication of CRF Program 
 
NCRC believes that the CRF program has been valuable on a number of different levels.  First 
and most importantly, the program has saved families’ homes and millions of dollars in equity 
                                                 
60 Federal Register, September 26, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 187), pages 60542-60555, see footnote 28 which 
specifically references data collected from the CRF program. 
61 See http://www.responsibleappraisal.org/. 
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for borrowers.  Second, NCRC and our lending institution partners have gained much knowledge 
about predatory lending that has provided insights into needed reforms.  Through dialogues 
between community groups and lending institutions, the CRF program has contributed to a 
consensus regarding which products and practices should be discontinued and others that should 
be limited.  For example, the CRF program has uncovered a number of abuses in the servicing of 
high cost loans, leading to best practices and reforms embraced by major fee-based servicers and 
guidelines issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  The CRF program has contributed to 
best practices in subprime lending and in alternative dispute resolution. 
 
Third, while the CRF program is a collaboration between NCRC and lending institutions, it also 
contributes to enforcement when necessary.  As mentioned above, NCRC has filed complaints 
with HUD such as the case against Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corporation when the CRF 
program uncovers systematic abuses or discrimination by lenders. 
 
Expansion of the CRF program is clearly desirable and is a goal pursued vigorously by NCRC.  
Yet, expanding the CRF program is not an easy task.  Lending institutions are assuming 
significant risk in a CRF program since loans often involve moderate to deep subsidies to 
borrowers with damaged credit.  In order to mitigate risk in the program, the CRF program has 
incorporated early delinquency intervention.  Once every two weeks, HSBC North America 
provides NCRC with a list of CRF borrowers that have just fallen behind on their payments.  A 
CRF fair lending specialist will then work with these borrowers in early delinquency.  The early 
intervention has been effective. CRF staff have negotiated temporary work-outs and forbearance 
of payments for a few months.  Another arrangement has been adding delinquent payments to the 
outstanding mortgage amount.  Thus, for the continued success and expansion of programs like 
CRF, early delinquency intervention is necessary.   
 
Another method for mitigating risk is to encourage the participation of more than one lending 
institution in the program.  At this point, HSBC North America is refinancing the entire 
mortgage.  The CRF program originally arranged refinance loans with loan-to-value ratios as 
high as 100%.  Now, the program uses 85% loan-to-value ratios as the underwriting guideline, 
with some exceptions made on a case by case basis.  In order to be most effective in reaching 
consumers in need, it would be desirable to secure the participation of more than one lending 
institution in the program.  Other lenders could take on second mortgages and/or provide grants 
so that the loans and grants could once again provide for 100% loan-to-value ratios.  The 
involvement of two or more lenders would therefore mitigate risk and serve a greater pool of 
borrowers.   
 
NCRC’s CRF program will continue to evolve in ways that can most efficiently serve the 
overwhelming needs for intervention.  The CRF program, for example, will expand upon home 
preservation counseling, that is, counseling that is offered to borrowers after they have purchased 
their homes and/or have started experiencing trouble making payments.  This type of counseling 
can save an enormous amount of time and resources, since borrowers in trouble often do know 
they can attempt to voluntarily work out a solution with their lender or servicer, whether it is 
forbearance of payments or modifying loan terms.  CRF staff also recommend that more 
attention should be focused on home preservation counseling in general.  Most counseling is still 
directed at buying a home rather than maintaining homeownership after purchasing a home.   
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Lastly, another model worth replication is the State of Pennsylvania’s Homeowners Emergency 
Mortgage Assistance Program (HEMAP).  Perhaps the only program of its kind in the nation, 
HEMAP provides loans to borrowers experiencing temporary hardship (the loans make 
borrowers’ mortgage payments current).  Counseling agencies work out forbearance agreements 
with lenders and also counsel families regarding their financial situations.  The program is 
funded by State appropriations and repayment of HEMAP loans.  This type of program should be 
expanded to include intervening in predatory lending situations.  In addition to state 
appropriations, lenders could receive favorable consideration on their Community Reinvestment 
Act (CRA) exams for financing loan pools and/or participating in programs like CRF.62    
 
Conclusion of CRF Section 
 
The CRF program provides enormous benefits on many different levels.  It has saved homes and 
has saved approximately $100 million in equity since the program’s inception in 2001.  The 
CRF’s alternative dispute resolution, mediation and refinancing saves enormous time and 
resources.  At the same time, however, CRF has also contributed to litigation when systematic 
abuses or discrimination are uncovered.  Furthermore CRF has informed best practices as well as 
legislative and regulatory reforms.  The multiple nature of abuses on CRF loans suggests that 
borrowers of high cost loans are often not in a position to negotiate the best deal for themselves 
in enormously complex lending transactions.  These borrowers are often in desperate situations 
following temporary hardships and/or are unfamiliar with the lending process.  Strong consumer 
protections in national and state legislation therefore are needed.  Counseling, while extremely 
valuable, is unlikely to reach all the borrowers needing counseling across the country in the near 
or medium term.  And it is all the better when collaborative programs like CRF contribute to 
policy changes based on consensus building between industry and community organizations 
regarding which products have no place in the marketplace and which products or loan terms 
should have limitations.  Finally, the CRF experience has provided valuable insights into how to 
expand the CRF program as well as other similar efforts across the country.  
 
Policy Recommendations 
 
Preserving assets from wealth depleting products and loans is a very complex process.  As this 
paper describes, low and stagnating wage levels are a persistent challenge.  However, beyond 
providing income supports there are prescriptions that can enable lower-income consumers to 
grow and preserve assets.      
 
Public Policies to Encourage Savings and Asset Development 
The New America Foundation has established a comprehensive agenda of public policies to 
encourage lower-income consumers to develop assets.  They include a national Children’s 
Savings Account, enabling recipients of the EITC to link their refunds to savings accounts, 
expanding the Section 8 Homeownership Voucher Program, and promoting savings bonds.63   
 
Improving Savings and Investment Products 
The current offering of savings and investment products are often inaccessible to lower-income 
people.  An increase in higher yield savings options, particularly those facilitated by employers, 
could increase the savings rate.  Lowering the minimum opening deposit for mutual funds could 
                                                 
62 See http://www.phfa.org/hsgresources/faq.aspx#hemap_q6.  Last accessed August 30, 2006. 
63 New America Foundation, 2006 
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also help lower-wage workers save for the future.   Further, automatic enrollment has been found 
to increase participation in retirement plans, particularly among lower-income workers.64  
Employers should be encouraged to adopt inclusive policies for pension plans, including a 
requirement to ‘opt out’ as opposed to the current default position of ‘opt in’.   
 
Increasing Access To Affordable Financial Services  
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) service test assesses bank records of opening and 
closing bank branches and the availability of products and services.  However, unlike the lending 
test which utilizes Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data to determine how well a bank 
performs, the service test does not assess how well a bank penetrates lower-income communities.  
It is imperative that the service test include an examination of bank customers and deposits by 
income level of customers to determine whether banks are effectively reaching low-income 
consumers.  Further, an examination of the location of bank branches as part of the CRA 
examination could point to disparities in communities of color or low-income areas.  Finally, the 
federal agencies have recently stipulated in the CRA regulation that illegal and abusive loans will 
penalize banks through lower CRA ratings.  The examiners, however, need to be more 
transparent on CRA tests, clearly describing how they scrutinized bank loan files to determine if 
abusive lending occurred.   
 
CRA needs to be modernized to apply to large credit unions, independent mortgage companies, 
insurance firms and securities companies.  Applying CRA to non-bank financial institutions is 
critical in terms of increasing access to wealth building opportunities and assets for minorities 
and low- and moderate-income families.  Harvard University and Federal Reserve economists 
have documented that CRA has increased lending to minorities and low- and moderate-income 
families.65  It would be a reasonable assumption that applying CRA to non-bank financial 
institutions would likewise increase access to additional financial products, including 
investments and other asset-building products. 
 
Regulating High Cost Financial Services 
Regulating the high cost products described in this paper is a complex proposition.  Products like 
payday and auto title loans are regulated by states.  Others, like home mortgages, may be 
regulated by both state and federal policymakers.  In addition, the features of consumer loans are 
very different from home mortgages.  However, basic and strong consumer protections 
implemented at the federal level are crucial, including limitations on certain loan terms and 
conditions that are prone to abuse and requiring lenders to document the borrower’s ability to 
repay the loan.    
 
Narrowing the Financial Management Skills Gap 
Financial education is an area where conservatives and liberals agree.  Conservative 
policymakers and academics, as well as high cost lenders, talk about the importance of personal 
responsibility in avoiding high cost products and high levels of debt.   However, effective 
personal responsibility  can not occur in a vacuum.  Consumers require skills and information to 
navigate an increasingly complex financial landscape.  It is particularly important to begin 
financial education with children, so that basic values, such as saving and investing are 
developed at an early age.  Appropriate and updated curricula for adults on basic financial 
management and loan products is also critical.  Further, curricula must apprise consumers of 
                                                 
64 New America Foundation, 2006 
65 Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University (2001 & 2002), and Bostic and Robinson (2003). 
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their rights in a financial transaction and give them the ability to identify and assess the long-
term risks of financial products.  In addition, programs should be developed to help reach these 
consumers at the workplace, through community organizations collaborating with responsible 
financial institutions.   
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